![]() ![]() This policy only removes the specific user interface options, but does not prevent the requests from being accepted by PANGPS. By sending “portal”-command with an arbitrary portal address, PANGPS responds that the user/PANGPA needs to perform an HTTPS request to the portal address and “prelogin” authenticate to the portal. By integrating Thales SafeNet Trusted Access across Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access, GlobalProtect, ML-Powered Next Generation Firewalls, and Cortex XSOAR. "Portal"-commands can be sent through this channel even if the client is limited by policy to add new portals. The tool is injected into the PANGPA executable (userland/GUI binary) to be able to use the existing PANGPS service communication channel. Using this information, a tool was developed that implements the custom protocol used in this communication as well as the encryption/decryption mechanisms used by GlobalProtect. Details of the communication between PANGPS and PANGPA have previously been publicly disclosed ( ). ![]() The most straightforward way of exploiting the vulnerability is to send the “portal” command to the PANGPS service to create a new portal configuration. ![]() The Global Protect client contains both a privileged system service (PANGPS) and a non-privileged user interface component (PANGPA). The vulnerability exists in one of the functions of the privileged component (PANGPS) that is reachable from the non-privileged component (PANGPA). ![]()
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